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# WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS


Week Ending 8 May 1971

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For the President Only



## SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

#### Enemy Activity

During the past week, enemy-initiated activity in South Vietnam remained at relatively low levels. There are some indications that an increase in the intensity of enemy action may occur in the eastern and central DMZ in the near future, but even if this should take place, it will probably consist largely of attacks by fire and small-scale ground actions.

In Cambodia, military activity has remained at a relatively low level and consisted primarily of attacks by fire and small-scale ground attacks. Although Route 4 is now open and one large convoy has moved unimpeded from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh, traffic will be somewhat restricted until repairs are completed in the Pich Nil area. No significant action occurred in the TOAN THANG area of operations during the week. In the northwest, Cambodian army elements launched clearing operations in the vicinity of Kralanh and Samrong to counter Communist pressure on rural areas and lines of communications.

Northeast of Luang Prabang, the government counteroffensive continues to regain lost territory, while southwest of the Plain of Jars small unit engagements and attacks by fire prevail. In south Laos, renewed enemy activity is expected on two major fronts as government irregulars withdraw from Muong Phalane to defend Dong Hene. Farther south, Ban Houei Sai and Paksong are threatened. At Pakse, another 40-50 Pathet Lao have rallied. The new group, which includes officers from the enemy's Southern Laos Command as well as members of the 11th Pathet Lao Battalion, brings the number of ralliers in the past two months to about 150.

#### Enemy Infiltration

No detections of southward moving infiltration groups were made during the week, further suggesting that the 1970-71 dry season infiltration cycle may be essentially completed. The acceptance of two "gap-fill" groups totalling 1,100, however, raises the infiltration estimate since 1 October 1970 to some 60,100 to 62,100. Reporting by way stations along the trail remains spotty, but the evidence available suggests that few infiltrators are transiting the system. If this is the case, it would conform with past patterns of sharply reduced personnel infiltration inputs during April and May. Recent intercepts from logistic elements in Laos have indicated that a transportation drive is planned for May and that the Communists will stay in place during this year's rainy season and continue their supply efforts as long as the weather conditions permit. Last year, enemy transportation elements remained on station during the rainy season, but no major supply effort occurred until well after the rains had ended. As long as these units man the infiltration corridor, the system is capable of handling a substantial personnel flow even during the rainy season.

### South Vietnam Developments

All three of the likely major presidential candidates are beginning to stake out their policy positions. Vice President Ky is attempting in his public and private comments to take a position midway between what he calls Thieu's "total victory" line and Big Minh's "peace-at-any-price." Ky professes to believe that a military victory is no longer possible, and has indicated a willingness to change the constitution to allow the Communist Party to operate overtly in South Vietnam. He says he wants a ceasefire followed by peaceful coexistence with the North, and the complete elimination of foreign influence, including American. In contrast to this somewhat "dovish" stance of Ky, President Thieu is making one or two trips to the provinces each week giving speeches in which he takes a staunch anti- $25 \times 10^{-25}$ Communist line. He is emphasizing the four "no's" -- no coalition, no neutrality, no territorial concessions, and no legal Communist Party. Big Minh, meanwhile, has indicated that he favors a political solution to the war, no coalition, a role for the Communists in the political process, social reform, "pro-U.S." neutrality, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces, except for a residue force which would remain in enclaves.